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In his seminal model (Feldstein, 1985), the government operates a social security system to 
counter the representative worker's myopia. (i) For a complete myope, he determined a 
sizable optimal tax rate (and the corresponding benefit level). (ii) For a partially shortsighted 
worker, he determined another optimum, which was much lower, possibly zero. Departing 
from Feldstein, I take into account that neither a paternalistic government nor a cautious 
bank tolerates long-term negative saving, and then even in (ii), the government may choose 
the first rather than the second optimum. Having revised it, Feldstein's model regains its 
place in the textbooks.    
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 Hogyan becsülte alá Feldstein (1985)  
a tb-nyugdíj optimális szintjét? 
 
Simonovits András 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
Nagy hatású modelljében (Feldstein, 1985) a kormányzat egy tb-nyugdíjrendszer segítségével 
küzd a reprezentatív egyén rövidlátása ellen. 1) Teljesen rövidlátó dolgozó esetén Feldsteinnél 
a társadalmilag optimális tb-nyugdíj szintje jelentősnek adódott. 2) Részlegesen rövidlátó 
dolgozó esetén azonban Feldstein egy másik optimumot talált, amely jelentősen kisebb, 
esetenként 0 volt. Feldsteinnel ellentétben nem siklom el afölött, hogy sem egy jó szándékú 
kormányzat, sem egy óvatos bank nem engedi meg, hogy egy dolgozó a nyugdíjjárulékot 
hosszú távú kölcsönből fedezze. Ekkor a kormányzat a részleges rövidlátás esetén is szükség 
szerint 2) helyett az 1) nyugdíjat választja: azaz a valódi optimum jóval nagyobb lehet, mint 
Feldsteiné. A javított Feldstein-modell visszanyeri helyét a tankönyvekben. 
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JEL-kód: D10, H55, J13, J14, J18, J26 
 
Köszönetnyilvánítás: 
 
A szerző köszönetet mond Nicholas Barrnak hasznos tanácsaiért.  
A szerző elismeri az OTKA  K 108668  pályázat támogatását. 
level6
How did Feldstein (1985) undervalue
the optimal level of social security benefits?
by
Andra´s Simonovits
Institute of Economics, RCERS, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
also Mathematical Institute, Budapest University of Technology,
Budapest, Budao¨rsi u´t 45, Hungary
September 1, 2017
Abstract∗
In his seminal model (Feldstein, 1985), the government operates a social security system
to counter the representative worker’s myopia. (i) For a complete myope, he determined
a sizable optimal tax rate (and the corresponding benefit level). (ii) For a partially
shortsighted worker, he determined another optimum, which was much lower, possibly
zero. Departing from Feldstein, I take into account that neither a paternalistic govern-
ment nor a cautious bank tolerates long-term negative saving, and then even in (ii), the
government may choose the first rather than the second optimum. Having revised it,
Feldstein’s model regains its place in the textbooks.
Keywords: social security, myopia, paternalism, social welfare
JEL numbers: D10, H55, J13, J14, J18, J26
∗ I express my indebtedness to Nicholas Barr for his comments on earlier versions. The author
has received generous financial support from the Hungarian Science Research Foundation’s projects K
108668.
i
I. Introduction
Since Samuelson (1958), an exploding number of papers model the interaction of social
security and private saving. In a two-period overlapping generations model, the level of
social security benefit is equal to the product of the per-period GDP growth factor and of
the tax, while the private ‘benefit’ is equal to the product of the per-period interest factor
and of the saving. To determine the socially optimal level of social security benefits,
Feldstein (1985) used a very simple model: Choosing her saving, the representative
worker maximizes a discounted lifetime utility function. Choosing the socially optimal
tax rate, the paternalistic government maximizes a social welfare function, where the
discount factor is higher than the individual one. Using the framework of Stackelberg-
game, here the government is the leader and the individual is the follower. Though the
interest factor is greater than the GDP growth factor, for very shortsighted workers,
the optimal social security may partially or fully crowd out private saving.
Feldstein (1985) was the first who sought to determine the dependence of the optimal
social security benefit level or equivalently, the tax rate on the individual discount factor.
Using illustrative data, he came to two conclusions: (i) if the representative worker is
completely shortsighted, then the socially optimal social security tax is sizable. (ii) If
the representative worker is strongly but not completely shortsighted, this is not the
case.
Deriving his surprising discontinuity result, however, he used a very peculiar assump-
tion A: The worker can choose negative savings. He overlooked the fact that neither
a benevolent government nor a cautious bank allows the worker to pay social security
taxes from long-term credit, to be repaid from social security benefits after retirement.
(In addition, he also used another ‘strong’ assumption B: when calculating her optimal
savings, the representative worker only expects a small share of the actual benefit. As
we shall see below, assumption B weakened the weight of assumption A!) Requiring
nonnegative saving (assumption C), I show that even in his own numerical setup, Feld-
stein’s first optimum may be much higher than his second and the government may
choose the first rather the second.
Anticipating the details of the main results, Figure 1 displays two relative efficiency–
tax rate curves—in both cases, the social welfare at any tax rate is expressed in terms
of social welfare without social security: (i) curve 1 shows the relative efficiency (or
consumption equivalent variation) when there is no saving; (ii) curve 2 shows the relative
efficiency when saving can be negative. The true relative efficiency curve—corresponding
to (C)—is equal to the maximum of the two curve. In the case described in Section 2.3,
we have two local maxima: (i) at tax rate 0.4, the relative efficiency is equal to 1.064;
(ii) while at tax rate 0.19, the relative efficiency is 1.026.
insert Figure 1 about here
One may doubt if there is any interest in revising an abstract model of social security
from 1985, especially since Auerbach and Kotlikof (1987) opened the way to analyze
detailed and calibrated general equilibrium pension models. Nevertheless, I have three
reasons to share my discovery with the public:
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(a) During his long and distinguished career, Martin Feldstein has been a leading
partisan of cutting back the social security (from Feldstein (1974) to Feldstein (2005)),
so the message of his pioneering model has exceptional importance. A separate question
is whether Feldstein’s pension policy is correct or not. Among others, Barr and Diamond
(2008, Sections 2.2 and 3.5) convincingly argued that without taking into account the
lack of complete markets and income redistribution, one cannot properly evaluate the
positive role of social security.
(b) Feldstein’s seminal paper serves as a starting point for many theoretical papers,
beginning with Feldstein (1987) on mean-testing. To acknowledge my intellectual debt
to Martin Feldstein, I refer to two papers of mine done in Feldstein’s modified framework:
Simonovits (2015a) on the importance of the credit constraint and Simonovits (2015b)
on the choice of the socially optimal contribution rate and cap on the wage.
(c) The mistake of neglecting credit constraints is widespread in the related literature
(e.g. the seminal paper by van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) and its critique by
Simonovits (2015c)) on the Siamese twins of pensions and child allowances), therefore
the problem deserves a treatment.
II. The model reconsidered
In my reconsideration of Feldstein’s model, I try to follow closely his notations, but
their clumsiness (of insisting on interest and growth rates rather than the corresponding
factors) prevents me from a complete copying. To confine attention to the logical error,
I do not consider the case of heterogeneous population (Feldstein, 1985, Section III).
I also skip the dynamics of overlapping generations, including the problem of the first
generation, the members of which received benefits without paying for it. First I shall
determine the individual optimum (via private saving), then the social optimum (via
tax rate). Finally I shall numerically illustrate my finding on a parameter set borrowed
from Feldstein, already displayed in Figure 1.
Individual optimum
The quantities of the model are generally nonnegative real numbers, except if stated
otherwise. The whole society is represented by a single individual who lives for two
periods of equal lengths. (Note that the correct proportion would be 2:1, significantly
reducing the optimal tax rate but this would have complicated the dynamic analysis.)
In period 1, the young citizen works: she earns a unit wage, pays a tax rate θ and saves
s. By definition, 0 ≤ θ < 1 and s < 1 − θ. In period 2, she receives a social security
benefit b and her saving yields private pension Rs, where R = 1 + ρ is the per-period
interest factor.
To determine the connection between the tax rate θ and the benefit b, Feldstein
introduced demography and productivity growth, represented here by the per-period
population growth factor N = 1 + n and the per-period productivity growth factor
G = 1 + g. As is usual, N,G,R > 1 is assumed. Using the principle of dynamic
efficiency, which also states the a priori superiority of private saving over the public
one, R > NG is assumed. As is known, the foregoing relation is
b = NGθ. (1)
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By definition, the worker’s and pensioner’s consumption functions are respectively
c = 1− θ − s and d = b+Rs. (2)
Determining her own saving, the worker maximizes the following discounted utility
function with underestimated benefits:
U [s] = ln(1− θ − s) +D ln(αb+Rs), (3)
where D is the per-period discount factor (0 ≤ D < 1, λ in Feldstein, 1985) and α is
the ad hoc expected share of her true social security benefit. Because Feldstein makes
her very distrustful (assumption B), the value of the expected share is typically close or
even equal to 0. Nevertheless, for greater realism, I allow for higher shares, including
the so-called rational expectations (α = 1): 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Taking into account (1) and (3), Feldstein’s optimal saving is determined by the
first-order condition
0 = U ′[s] =
−1
1− θ − s +
DR
αNGθ +Rs
. (4)
Hence the optimal saving and the worker’s corresponding consumption are equal to
s˜(θ) =
D(1− θ)− αNGR−1θ
1 +D
and c˜(θ) =
1− θ + αNGR−1θ
1 +D
. (5)
For the record, it is mentioned that due to R > NG, c˜(θ) is a decreasing function.
Note that Feldstein did not exclude the possibility of negative saving (no credit
constraint, assumption A) and in his preferred case of α ≈ 0, for low enough tax rates,
the positivity is automatically ensured. But even Feldstein sometimes considered weaker
underestimation and then negative saving occurs for sensible tax rates. Since both a
truly paternalistic government and a cautious bank exclude this possibility (assumption
C), therefore we shall work with a modified (5): s(θ) = s˜(θ)+, where x+ stands for the
positive part of the real x: x+ = x for x ≥ 0 and x+ = 0 for x < 0.
Substituting s(θ) into (2) yields the corrected consumption functions:
c(θ) = 1− θ − s(θ) and d(θ) = NGθ +Rs(θ). (6)
Government optimum
Next we turn to the government optimum. We rest satisfied with the optimal tax
rate rather than the corresponding benefit level [cf. (1)]. Following Lerner (1944),
Feldstein (1985) assumed a paternalistic government, which chooses the socially optimal
tax rate θ to maximize the weighted sum of the current representative worker’s and the
corresponding pensioners’ per-period utility functions:
V (θ) = ln c(θ) +
1
N
ln[d(θ)/G]. (7)
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As a side remark: already Docquier (2002) noted that it would have been more logical to
follow Samuelson (1958), who identified social welfare with the (undiscounted) lifetime
utility
V (θ) = ln c(θ) + ln d(θ). (7′)
Note also that the current old-age consumption d/G in (7) is replaced by the future
old-age consumption d in (7′), and Lerner’s choice diminishes the paternalistic discount
factor from 1 to 1/N < 1.
For any given α, there generally exists a separator tax rate θα ∈ [0, 1], for which
Feldstein’s saving becomes zero. By (5),
s˜(θα) = 0, i.e. θα =
D
D + αNGR−1
∈ [0, 1]. (8)
Therefore, both consumption functions in (6) have two branches, one for 0 ≤ θ ≤ θα
and another one for θα < θ ≤ 1. Except for either D = 0 or α = 0 when θα(0) = 0 or
θ0 = 1, both intervals are nonempty.
It will be useful to display both branches of the consumption functions:
c(θ) = 1− θ − s˜(θ), d(θ) = NGθ +Rs˜(θ) for 0 ≤ θ ≤ θα (6a)
and
c(θ) = 1− θ, d(θ) = NGθ for θα < θ < 1. (6b)
Following Feldstein (1985, Sections I and II), we start the discussion with a degen-
erate case and continue with the nondegenerate case.
Complete myopia: D = 0. Then (6a) is empty, c(θ) = 1 − θ and d(θ) = NGθ,
yielding V (θ) = ln(1− θ) +N−1 ln(Nθ). Then the first-order optimality condition is
V ′(θ) =
−1
1− θ +
1
Nθ
= 0,
providing the optimal tax rate for completely myopes:
θT =
1
1 +N
, (9)
where T refers to the tight credit constraint.
We continue with the nondegenerate case, where the optimal individual saving is
positive, at least for moderate social security.
Partial myopia: 0 < D < 1/N . Feldstein’s second optimal tax rate θS (here S
refers to the slack credit constraint) can be determined as [cf. (6a)]
either
θS = 0 if V ′(0) =
c′(0)
c(0)
+
1
N
d′(0)
d(0)
≤ 0 (10a)
or the unique root of
V ′(θ) =
c′(θ)
c(θ)
+
1
N
d′(θ)
d(θ)
= 0 for 0 < θ < θα. (10b)
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We do not follow Feldstein in his drive for an explicit formula [see his (28) on p.
312] nor his separation of the pure private system θS = 0 and the mixed private-public
system θS > 0. But note that in contrast to (10a), Feldstein (1985, p. 313) mentioned
the possibility of nonpositive, moreover negative social security tax rate [θ∗ ≤ 0 or
θ∗ < 0].
It is of certain interest that Feldstein deducted θT from his θS, just inserting D = 0,
but only for α = 0. Note, however, that such deduction is wrong for any α > 0, as my
(5a) degenerates into s˜(θ) = −αNGR−1θ rather than to 0.
Rather we concentrate on how the neglected second branch defined in (θα, 1) influ-
ences the validity of Feldstein’s result. Our starting point is that the second branch of
V (θ) coincides with that studied in the case called complete myopia.
If θα > θT holds, then the completely myopic optimum falls into the first branch,
therefore θT is not an optimum: Feldstein’s neglect is innocent. Using (8) and (9), this is
equivalent to D > αGR−1. If D > GR−1, then our last but one inequality holds for any
α ∈ [0, 1]. (Note that due to dynamic efficiency and N > 1, the interval GR−1 < D ≤
N−1 is not empty!) If D ≤ GR−1, then there exists a critical expectation share α∗ =
DR/G ≤ 1 and in the nonempty interval 0 ≤ α < α∗, Feldstein’s analysis is watertight.
This may explain Feldstein’s preference for the unrealistically low expectation shares.
We continue the discussion with the case θα ≤ θT, being equivalent to α∗ ≤ α ≤ 1.
In addition to θS, now the completely myopic rate θT is also a local optimum. Even in
this second case, it is a further question which optimum is the true (global) one: the
slack or the tight? If V (θS) > V (θT), then the optimal pure private or mixed private–
public system is superior to the optimal pure social security; if V (θS) ≤ V (θT), then
vice versa. We shall see, however, that in at least one of Feldstein’s numerical examples,
the second case occurs and then Feldstein’s neglect of the pure social security system is
logically wrong.
Numerical illustration
To construct Figure 1 (displayed above) we must fill the underlying formula with num-
bers. I describe now the numerical data borrowed from Feldstein. Working with pe-
riod length of 30 years: the cumulated factors are respectively equal to D = 0.05 =
1/(1 + d)30 (due to annual discount rate d = 0.105), N = (1 + 0.014)30 = 1.52,
G = (1 + 0.022)30 = 1.921 and R = (1 + 0.08)30 = 10.063 (Feldstein, 1985, pp. 307 and
313–314). Note also that now α∗ = DR/G = 0.05× 10.063/1.921 = 0.262 is the critical
value, well below α = 0.5. Here θS = 0.19, while θT = 0.4.
To compare the social welfare’s values provided by the two local optima, we shall
use the relative efficiency of both optima. For D > 0, the relative efficiency of θ with
respect to θ = 0 is defined as a positive number ε(θ), with which multiplying the unitary
wage and the corresponding benefit level, the social welfare at θ = 0 becomes equal to
the social welfare at θ without changing the unitary wage and the benefit. In formula:
V [ε, 0] = V [1, θ], i.e.
ε = exp {(V [1, θ]− V [1, 0])/2} = exp {(V (θ)− V (0))/2}.
Then
ε(θS) = 1.026 and ε(θT) = 1.064.
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It is difficult to resist the temptation to present the results for the neglected rational
expectations, i.e. α = 1. Then θS drops to 0 while θT remains 0.4. The difference
between the relative efficiencies of T and S-optima grows from 0.038 to 0.064!
To round the picture, for α = 0, θS = 0.28 and εS = 1.136 > 1.117 = εT, thus in
Feldstein’s favorite case, the mixed system is indeed welfare superior to the pure social
security.
In words: the relative efficiency of Feldstein’s local optimum is frequently if not
always significantly lower than that of the global optimum. Feldstein’s error in under-
valuation of the socially optimal social security benefits is demonstrated. Of course, it
would be useful to give a general analytical condition on the superiority of this or that
solution (cf. Simonovits, 2015a).
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